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I.    INTRODUCTION 
Colombia has long struggled with the fact that it is the 
world leader in coca (Erythroxylum coca) cultivation and co-
caine production.  The leading strategy in combating this harsh 
reality has been the large-scale aerial spraying of coca crops 
with chemical herbicides.  In 1999, with financial aid from the 
United States, Colombia’s then-President Andres Pastrana 
Arango adopted “Plan Colombia,” a counter-narcotics plan em-
phasizing the use of aerial herbicides along Colombia’s south-
west border, which lies adjacent to Ecuador’s Esmeraldas, Car-
chi and Sucumbio provinces.1
Glyphsoate is the herbicide of choice for Plan Colombia 
sprayings.  While there is conflicting scientific data regarding 
the adverse health effects of glyphosate, it is typically used in 
combination with surfactants – substances that increase the 
herbicide intake in plants – that may be more toxic than gly-
phosate itself.
 
2  Ecuador alleges in its Application Instituting 
Proceedings (hereinafter “Application”) that Colombia used a 
polyethoxylated tallowamine (hereinafter “POEA”), namely 
Cosmoflux 411F, as a surfactant in its herbicide spray, produc-
ing a more toxic mixture than using glyphosate alone.3
Ecuador alleges widespread environmental damage has oc-
curred as a result of this fumigation regime.
 
4  Since aerial fu-
migations began under the auspices of Plan Colombia in 2000, 
there have been numerous reports of herbicides drifting or be-
ing directly dispersed on Ecuadorian territory.5
                                                 
1 Application Instituting Proceedings (Ecuador v. Colom.), 2008 I.C.J. 
Pleadings 10 (Mar. 31, 2008), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/-
files/138/14474.pdf (last visited September 7, 2009) [hereinafter Application].   
  Residents of 
Ecuador reported a multitude of adverse health effects, includ-
ing fevers, diarrhea, intestinal bleeding, and nausea, as well as 
2 Application, supra note 1, para. 22. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. para. 13.   
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skin and eye problems.6  Agricultural crops and vegetation, in-
cluding yucca, corn, rice, plantains, cocoa, coffee and fruit, were 
allegedly devastated in the affected regions.7  Similar claims 
were made with respect to the indigenous wildlife; reports of 
poultry, fish, dogs, horses, cows and other animals becoming ill 
and dying are all cited in Ecuador’s Application.8
Furthermore, Ecuador recounts several attempts to recon-
cile this transboundary dispute with Colombia.  On July 24, 
2000 a note was sent to the Colombian Embassy from the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs of Ecuador expressing concern over 
“grave impacts on human health and the environment, with 
possible repercussions for Ecuador.”
 
9  A ten kilometer (10 km) 
“buffer zone” along the shared border was contemplated in 
2001, rejected by Colombia on September 23, 2003,10 estab-
lished for a brief period of time in December 2006, but dis-
solved soon thereafter.11 Joint scientific committees, including 
both Ecuadorian and Colombian officials, formed in 2003, 2005 
and 2007.  All of the committees ended without agreement or 
consensus on any of the transboundary issues.12
On March 31, 2008, Ecuador seized the International 
Court of Justice (hereinafter “ICJ”) of a dispute between itself 
and Colombia concerning Colombia’s alleged aerial spraying of 
toxic herbicides at locations near, at and across the border with 
Ecuador.  Ecuador claims that: 
 
Colombia has violated Ecuador’s rights under customary and 
conventional international law.  The harm that has occurred, and 
is further threatened, includes some with irreversible conse-
quences, indicating that Colombia has failed to meet its obliga-
                                                 
6 Application, supra note 1, para. 14.   
7 Id. 
8 Id.  
9 Id. para. 28. 
10 Id. para. 30.   
11 Id. 
12 Application, supra note 1, para. 33.   
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tions of prevention and precaution.13
Ecuador requests the ICJ declare the following: first, that Co-
lombia has violated obligations under international law as a 
result of transboundary harms; second, indemnification for any 
loss or damage caused by Colombia’s internationally unlawful 
act, particularly death or injury to any persons, loss or damage 
to property or livelihood, environmental damage and depletion 
of natural resources; and third, costs of monitoring to identify 
and monitor future risks to public health.
   
14  By Order of May 
30, 2008, the ICJ fixed April 29, 2009 as the time limit for fil-
ing a Memorial by Ecuador, and March 29, 2010 as the time 
limit for filing a Counter-Memorial by Colombia.15
As this case is still in its preliminary stages, this article 
concerns itself with two main issues: first, the historical and 
political background to the dispute; second, taking Ecuador’s 
allegations as true, this article focuses on the merits of Ecua-
dor’s transboundary pollution claim, and Colombia’s best possi-
ble defense.  Part II tackles the former, and breaks down Ecua-
dor’s claim by separating the transboundary harms into three 
categories:  harm to humans, harm to animals and crops, and 
harm to the environment.  Part III of this article, recognizing 
that the ICJ will draw on myriad sources in rendering its opi-
nion in this case, nevertheless limits itself to a brief overview of 
prior ICJ jurisprudence in the field of international environ-
mental law, drawing largely from the work of Dr. Jorge E. 
Viñuales. 
 
From this admittedly limited vantage point, Part IV 
tackles the second issue, beginning with a brief discussion of 
the ICJ’s jurisdiction over the dispute, and then arguing for the 
elevation of the International Law Commission’s 2001 Draft 
Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazard-
ous Activities to the status of customary international law. 
Taking Ecuador’s allegations as true, this article finds all four 
criteria necessary for a valid transboundary harm claim under 
                                                 
13 Id. para. 37. 
14 Id. para. 38. 
15 Case Concerning Aerial Herbicide Spraying (Order of May 30, 2008), 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/138/14629.pdf (last visited Sep-
tember 7, 2009) [hereinafter May Order]. 
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Article 1 of the Draft Articles on Prevention present in Ecua-
dor’s Application.  Consequently, it contemplates how the ICJ 
might apply the substantive and procedural aspects of Articles 
3, 9 and 10 to this dispute.  In turning to Colombia’s potential 
defenses, this article suggests Colombia’s best defense is to 
claim a state of necessity, excusing any violations of interna-
tional law to protect its essential interest in maintaining do-
mestic peace, and offers an analysis of such a defense.   
Part V concludes by acknowledging the great potential the 
Case Concerning Aerial Herbicide Spraying possesses to ad-
vance international environmental law and the ICJ’s unique 
role in that process.  Like many international disputes, this 
case raises a multitude of issues beyond simply Ecuador’s envi-
ronmental claims, such as potential third-party liability and 
Colombia’s unauthorized unilateral uses of force in Ecuadorian 
territory.  However, this article stresses the unprecedented op-
portunity for the ICJ to examine the substantive and procedur-
al aspects of a State’s sic utere obligation of prevention, and to 
balance two competing essential interests in the event Colom-
bia adopts a state of necessity defense.  These two issues have 
the potential to shape the future of transboundary pollution lit-
igation and the body of international environmental law for the 
21st century. 
II.    BACKGROUND TO THE AERIAL HERBICIDE 
SPRAYING CASE 
A. A History of Plan Columbia and Foreign Intervention 
In its Application, Ecuador points out that Colombia’s 
aerial spraying regime to eliminate illegal narcotics production 
and trade has been roundly criticized for some time. 16
                                                 
16 Application, supra note 1, para. 10 (citing Sampedro v. Ministry of 
Env't, Administrative Tribunal of Cundinamarca, Colombia, § 2(B), June 13, 
2006, at 15).  
  In fact, 
over two decades ago Colombia’s own National Health Institute 
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advised against the use of any herbicides.17  There is evidence 
showing Colombia has relied on aerial herbicide spraying as a 
counter-narcotic tactic as far back as the late 1970s.18  Despite 
criticism from both home and abroad, Colombia reinvigorated 
its herbicide-spraying program in 1994, and again in 2000 un-
der the “Plan Colombia” moniker with the help of the United 
States foreign aid funds.19
i. “Plan Colombia” in Columbia 
   
“Plan Colombia” was a $7.5 billion effort to simultaneously 
strengthen the Colombian government and combat the coun-
try’s narcotics problem.20  The focus of the anti-narcotics strat-
egy for Plan Colombia was the “Push into Southern Colombia” 
which involved intense use of aerial herbicides.21  The targets 
of Plan Colombia were the southern provinces, in particular 
Putumayo and Nariño.  These Colombian provinces abut the 
northern Ecuadorian provinces of Sucumbios, Carchi and Es-
meraldas.22  It is not surprising, then, that Ecuador alleges the 
transboundary herbicide spraying began soon after the Plan 
Colombia fumigations commenced in 2000.23
For example, Ecuador alleges that in October 2000, the 
Ecuadorian hamlet of San Marcos in Carchi Province, home to 
the Awá, and the settlement of Mataje in neighboring Esme-
raldas Province were sprayed by Colombian fumigation.
 
24
                                                 
17 Id.  The Colombia herbicide experts opposed aerial spraying of any 
herbicide, in particular, glyphosate.  Because acute toxicity and mutagenic 
effects were unknown in humans, the experts concluded the proposed herbi-
cide-spraying program was inadvisable “because it would be accepting human 
experimentation.” 
  Ad-
ditionally, Ecuador alleges that in January and February 2001, 
Colombia conducted a weeks-long fumigation campaign near 
18 Sarah Peterson, People and Ecosystems in Colombia: Casualties of the 
Drug War, 6 INDEP. REV. 427 (2002) (citing PATRICK L. CLAWSON & 
RENSSELAER W. LEE III, CROP SUBSTITUTION IN THE ANDES, ONDCP (1993)).   
19 See generally Peterson, supra note 18.   
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Application, supra note 1, para. 13.  
23 Id. 
24 Id.  
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San Francisco Dos in Sucumbios Province, consisting of daily 
fumigations from 6 a.m. to 4 p.m.25  Ecuador’s allegations cor-
respond with a January 31, 2001 article published in the New 
York Times, in which the Colombian Army “claimed to have  
killed a quarter of all coca crops there [in southern Colombia] 
in the last six weeks (emphasis added),”26 reportedly eradicat-
ing “45, 551 acres of coca”27 by the end of January 2001.  In all, 
Ecuador lists twelve instances in which its communities were 
harmed by Colombia’s aerial spraying, spanning from October 
2000 through January 2007.28
ii. United States Foreign Aid 
  These allegations beg the ques-
tion: how did the Colombian government fund such a wide-
spread aerial spraying program?  The short answer is foreign 
aid. 
Under the Emergency Supplemental Act (2000), the Unit-
ed States allocated nearly $1.1 billion in aid to Latin America 
to support counter-narcotics activities.29  Of the $1.1 billion, a 
majority of the funds were earmarked for Colombia.  For ex-
ample, sixty-million dollars ($60,000,000.00) for the procure-
ment, refurbishing, and support for UH-1H Huey II helicopters 
for the Colombian Army30; two-hundred thirty-four million dol-
lars ($234,000,000.00) for the procurement and support for UH-
60 Blackhawk helicopters for use by the Colombian Army31; the 
loan of one light observation aircraft for counter-drug activi-
ties,32
                                                 
25 Id. 
 etc.  The United States also allocated one-hundred eigh-
26 Juan Forero, No Crops Spared in Colombia’s Coca War, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 31, 2001, at A1. 
27 Id. 
28 Application, supra note 1, para. 17. 
29 Emergency Supplemental Act, H.R. Res. 4425, 106th Cong., 114 STAT. 
511, 570 (2000).  
30 Id. at 572. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 571. 
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ty-four million dollars ($184,000,000.00) for Department of De-
fense operations in support of the regional anti-narcotics ef-
forts.33  It is likely that these funds went towards, among other 
things, providing Colombian authorities with satellite maps to 
pinpoint the location of coca fields, and training Colombian 
Army battalions.34
With respect to Plan Colombia’s main focus, the so-called 
“Push into Southern Colombia,” the United States aid package 
allocated nearly four-hundred million dollars ($400,000,000.00) 
“to support the Government of Colombia’s objective to gain con-
trol of the drug producing regions of southern Colombia.”
 
35  Of 
the nearly half a billion dollars directly allocated in support of 
Plan Colombia, only ten-million dollars ($10,000,000.00) were 
earmarked for alternative development of the region, and fif-
teen-million dollars ($15,000,000.00) were earmarked for tem-
porary resettlement and employment of the anticipated flood of 
domestic refugees driven from their land as a result of the fu-
migation program.36
The United States foreign aid to Colombia reflected the 
American penchant for “supply-control” narcotics strategy.  The 
theory behind supply-control is, to wit:  destroying illicit crops 
will reduce drug availability, that lower availability will then 
drive up U.S. street prices, that higher prices will discourage 
consumption, thus resulting in a decrease of American drug 
users.
 
37  Supply-control strategies have been roundly criticized.  
Notably, Joy Wilson, Executive Director of the Washington Of-
fice on Latin America, in her 2006 testimony before the House 
International Relations Subcommittee on the Western Hemis-
phere stated, “[t]he supply-control strategies into which we 
have poured so many billions of dollars have patently failed to 
shrink drug availability.”38
                                                 
33 Peterson, supra note 18. 
  Wilson points to the estimates of 
34 Forero, supra note 26. 
35 Emergency Supplemental Act, supra note 29; see also Peterson, supra 
note 18.   
36 Peterson, supra note 18, at 429. 
37 Counternarcotics Strategies in Latin America, 111th Cong (2006) (tes-
timony of Joy Wilson, Executive Director, Washington Office on Latin Ameri-
ca) [hereinafter Wilson Testimony]. 
38 Id. 
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areas under coca cultivation to support her position: 
Despite record aerial spraying of over 130,000 hectares of coca 
crops in 2004, the total area under coca cultivation remained ‘sta-
tistically unchanged’ at 114,000 hectares, according to figures re-
leased by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) in 
March 2005 . . .  If the 2005 estimate for Colombia is in line with 
the 2003 and 2004 figures, then the area under coca cultivation 
in the Andes for 2005, according to the government’s own esti-
mates, will be roughly 179,000 hectares, only three (3) percent 
lower than the estimate for the year 2000, when Plan Colombia 
got under way.39
In addition to a mere three percent decrease in total area 
of coca cultivation through the first five years of Plan Colombia 
fumigations, Wilson also noted that coca growers may be in-
creasing their coca leaf yields per hectare, rendering any small 
decrease in the total land under cultivation negligible.
 
40  Wil-
son also pointed to evidence showing that supply-control strat-
egies led to a dramatic expansion in the areas where coca is 
grown in Colombia.  As of 2006, “[c]oca [could] be found in at 
least 23 of the country’s 32 provinces and is now often grown in 
smaller parcels, under shade, where it is harder to detect.”41
According to the UNODC, more than 60 percent of the coca fields 
detected in Colombia in 2004 were new, a finding that ‘revealed 
the important mobility of coca cultivation in Colombia and the 
strong motivation of the farmers to continue planting coca’ (em-
phasis added).
  In 
asserting that the supply control policy advocated by the Unit-
ed States has led to dispersion of coca cultivation to new loca-
tions in Colombia, Wilson cites to the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC):  
42
It is not within the scope of this article to discuss whether 
the United States might be liable for any of the alleged harms 
 
                                                 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
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resulting from the sprayings.  The aforementioned aid figures 
and the description of the supply-control strategy are included 
primarily to highlight the prodigious financial support Colom-
bia enjoyed in conducting its fumigation campaign, and to un-
derscore the significant and controversial role foreign aid 
played in influencing Colombia’s domestic counter-narcotics 
policy over the past decade.   While these facts may be ripe for 
inquiries into what liability, if any, the United States might 
face for the alleged environmental harms resulting from Plan 
Colombia sprayings, this article limits itself to an analysis of 
the dispute between Ecuador and Colombia and declines to 
consider third-party liability. 
B.    Plan Colombia and Transboundary Harms 
As Ecuador makes clear in its Application: 
This case concerns Colombia’s aerial spraying of toxic herbicides 
at locations near, at and across its border with Ecuador.  The 
spraying has already caused serious damage to people, to crops, 
to animals, and to the natural environment on the Ecuadorian 
side of the frontier, and poses a grave risk of further damage over 
time.43
For the purposes of this article, the following divides the 
available evidence with respect to transboundary harms into 
three categories: harm to humans, harm to crops and animals, 
and harm to the natural environment and ecosystem.  Howev-
er, before delving into an analysis of the various types of trans-
boundary harms, it is first necessary to ascertain the effects of 
the particular chemicals used by Colombia in the sprayings.  
This process is made increasingly difficult, however, given the 
fact that Colombia has refused to disclose the exact chemical 
makeup of its herbicides.
 
44
According to Ecuador’s Application, Colombia has made 
clear that the primary ingredient in its herbicide brew is gly-
phosate (N-phosponomethyl glycine, C6H17N2O5P), an isopropy-
lamine salt used widely as a weed killer.
   
45
                                                 
43 Application, supra note 1, para. 2. 
  Glyphosate is “a 
44 Id. para. 19. 
45 Id. 
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nonselective, broad-spectrum, systemic herbicide that is one 
the most widely used pesticides (by volume) in the world.”46  It 
inhibits an enzyme (enolpyruvylshikimate phosphate synthase) 
that is part of a plant’s shikimate pathway.  The result is “a 
prevention of the production of essential amino acids in any 
plant species, inhibiting plant growth.”47
Glyphosate is often portrayed as relatively innocuous to 
humans and animals because they lack the shikimate pathway 
the herbicide targets in plants; however, the warnings on the 
product suggest otherwise.
  In other words, gly-
phosate does not distinguish between illicit coca and other 
plants – it simply kills any plant it comes into contact with by 
preventing the production of necessary amino acids.   
48  Indeed, the warnings on glypho-
sate products call attention to the harmful effects the herbicide 
can have on humans upon contact with the eyes, if inhaled, or 
if swallowed, and explicitly states: “Do not apply this product 
in a way that will contact workers or other persons, either di-
rectly or through drift.  Only protected handlers may be in the 
area during application.”49  While precautions are reportedly 
taken by Colombian Army soldiers after spraying the herbicide, 
there is no evidence to indicate that similar precautions are 
taken by the people living in the fumigated areas.50
Glyphosate is rarely used alone.
   
51
                                                 
46 Laurel Sherret, Futility in Action: Coca Fumigation in Colombia, 35 J. 
OF DRUG ISSUES 151 (2005). 
  Typically, the herbicide 
is combined with other chemicals, known as surfactants, in an 
effort to increase efficiency by promoting greater intake 
47 Id. 
48 Application, supra note 1, para. 19. 
49 Id. para. 20. 
50 Forero, supra note 26. (“Because of the presence of rebels from the Re-
volutionary Armed Force of Colombia (FARC), the army must fly soldiers 
from two American-trained battalions before spraying herbicide from OVZ-10 
and T-65 planes.  The soldiers later shower to cleanse themselves of any of the 
herbicide, the military says (emphasis added)).” 
51 Application, supra note 1, para. 22.   
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through plant leaves.52  Ecuador claims that the exact surfac-
tant used in Plan Colombia sprayings has not been identified 
by the Colombian government, but reports have indicated that 
a polyethoxylated tallowamine (“POEA”), specifically Cosmo 
Flux 411F, has been included in Colombian herbicide mix-
tures.53  Of particular concern is the fact that CosmoFlux 411F 
is manufactured by the Colombian company Cosmoagro, and is 
therefore not subject to strict environmental requirements, 
creating the potential for especially harmful herbicide mix-
tures.54
Despite reassurances from the Colombian government that 
the surfactants were within accepted ranges for use on food 
products, Imperial Chemical Industries (“ICI”) – a British 
chemical manufacturer supplying one of the ingredients used 
in the manufacturing of Cosmo Flux 411F – discontinued sup-
plying one of Cosmo Flux 411F’s ingredients to Cosmoagro in 
2001.  ICI cited a lack of evidence of the effects of mixing the 
surfactant with glyphosate and a desire to disassociate itself 
with Colombia’s spraying program as reasons for its decision.
   
55  
Ecuador echoes ICI’s concerns in its Application: “[t]he glypho-
sate/Cosmo Flux combination has not been subject to proper 
evaluations for safety to humans or even to animals.”56
i. Transboundary Harm to Humans 
  With a 
firm background of the herbicide spray’s chemical makeup now 
in place, this article turns to the different types of transboun-
dary harm allegedly resulting from Plan Colombia’s spraying 
program. 
In its Application, Ecuador uses the hamlet of San Fran-
cisco Dos as an example of harm caused to its citizens as a re-
sult of Plan Colombia fumigations.  Specifically, Ecuador 
claims its citizens “developed serious adverse health reactions 
including fevers, diarrhea, intestinal bleeding, nausea and a 
                                                 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 See Sherret, supra note 46. 
55 Id. 
56 Application, supra note 1, para. 23. 
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variety of skin and eye problems.”57  Ecuador also notes that 
children were particularly prone to these adverse reactions, cit-
ing two deaths in the days immediately following the initial 
sprayings.58
Ecuador’s allegations regarding the deleterious effects on 
humans likely reflect a shift in the application of the supply-
side counter-narcotics strategy.  When the supply-side theory 
was conceived, larger industrial coca crops were the main tar-
gets of fumigation because they were the region’s major coca 
cultivators.  However, after Plan Colombia’s increased fumiga-
tion efforts, the large industrial cultivation operations relo-
cated to smaller campesino plots of land in the southern re-
gions of Colombia.
   
59  As a result, coca cultivation is now 
sprinkled amongst indigenous Amazonian communities in the 
jungles of southern Colombia, putting more people at risk of di-
rect and indirect spraying and simultaneously making coca cul-
tivation harder to detect. Indeed, reports over the past decade 
indicate an increase in the number of sprayings near homes 
where coca plants are often interspersed with licit food crops.60
Colombia has blamed supporters of Colombian insurgent 
groups, such as the Revolutionary Armed Forced of Colombia 
(hereinafter “FARC”),
   
61 for the increase in health complaints in 
its southern provinces.62  According to Colombian officials, 
these insurgents create false health complaints in an effort to 
protect areas used for coca cultivation from future fumiga-
tions.63
                                                 
57 Id. para. 14. 
  However, in an area of Colombia where indigenous 
58 Id. 
59 Sherret, supra note 46. 
60 Id.  
61 For a more detailed discussion of the FARC and Colombia’s unilateral 
use of force into Ecuador, see generally Frank M. Walsh, Rethinking the Le-
gality of Colombia’s Attack on the FARC in Ecuador:  A New Paradigm for 
Balancing Territorial Integrity, Self-Defense and the Duties of Sovereignty, 21 
PACE INT’L L. REV. 137 (2009). 
62 Sherret, supra note 46.  
63 Id.    
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peoples already suffer from higher mortality rates, malnou-
rishment, and poverty at a disproportionate rate, it is also 
possible that these poor health indicators make the indigenous 
peoples more vulnerable to the herbicide spraying.64  Regard-
less of source or veracity, the fact that thousands of individual 
health complaints have been reported with increasing frequen-
cy over the past decade is indisputable.  Moreover, mitigation 
of human harms is hindered by the lack of government warn-
ings prior to fumigation operations, due largely to fears that 
coca crops will be covered if the residents were notified of the 
time and place of the fumigations.65  This risky practice impe-
rils Colombia’s citizens, especially children and indigenous 
peoples.66
Ecuador asserts in its Application that Colombia’s fumiga-
tions have also produced substantial cultural side effects.  Cit-
ing a Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur (herei-
nafter, “U.N. Report”) on the status of human rights of 
indigenous peoples, Ecuador claims the Awá people have been 
particularly affected.  The U.N. Report states: 
 
Some indigenous communities in the area, including the Awá are 
vulnerable and this is particularly worrying.  In addition to the 
impact spraying, they . . . protest that their rights to food and 
health have been affected by spraying.  Apparently, after spray-
ing, the entire Sumac Pamba community was displaced and did 
not return to their place of origin . . . Spraying appears to be de-
stroying substance crops, diminishing soil quality and reducing 
yield, affecting both the economic activities of communities and 
the population’s access to adequate food.67
The U.N. Report stresses the inherent link between the 
status of indigenous peoples and the environmental biodiversi-
ty of the region; thus when crops and soil quality are degraded, 
the indigenous peoples suffer more than any other group. 
 
Beyond the plight of the Awá, there are dozens of indigen-
ous groups inhabiting the region.  The Amazon Alliance has 
identified fifty-eight (58) individual tribes inhabiting the area 
                                                 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Application, supra note 1, paras. 30-33. 
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targeted by Plan Colombia’s fumigations.68  These communities 
have used coca for nutritional, medicinal, and spiritual purpos-
es for centuries,69 and the Plan Colombia initiative flies in the 
face of their rights as indigenous peoples.70   Chewing coca 
leaves gives indigenous peoples access to certain vitamins and 
minerals, including calcium, that are otherwise lacking in their 
local diets, and also suppresses their appetite, an important 
mitigating factor in communities with unstable food supplies.71  
More distressing are the reports that Plan Colombia sprayings 
have resulted in a mass relocation of indigenous Amazonian 
peoples.  In 2006, Colombia, trailing only Sudan, had the 
second largest population of internally displaced persons in the 
world, with approximately forty-seven thousand (47,000) 
people displaced in 2005 alone. 72  Relocation has also been a 
major factor across the border, where Ecuador alleges: “a size-
able percentage of the local population has been forced to relo-
cate to areas further from the border with Colombia.”73  In to-
tal, Ecuador estimates as much as fifty percent (50%) of the 
population that formerly lived within ten kilometers (10 km) of 
the border with Colombia have fled since the start of Plan Co-
lombia.74
                                                 
68 Peterson, supra note 18, at 430 (citing Amazon Alliance and Washing-
ton Office on Latin America, U.S. Anti-Drug Endangers Indigenous Commun-
ities and Amazon Biodiversity, November 16, 2000). 
  In sum, the harm to humans allegedly suffered as a 
result of Plan Colombia fumigations includes serious adverse 
physical health effects, deprivation of rights to food and health, 
and forced relocation of indigenous peoples. 
69 Id. 
70 See generally, Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 
U.N.T.S. 79, Preamble and Art. 8(j). 
71 Peterson, supra note 18, at 430. 
72 See Wilson Testimony, supra note 37. 
73 Application, supra note 1, para. 36.  Specifically, Ecuador cites the 
community of Puerto Mestanza in Sucumbios Province, which was home to 
approximately 86 tenant farmer families in August 2002, but was reduced to 
four families by 2005 as a result of the sprayings.   
74 Id. 
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ii.  Transboundary Harm to Animals and Crops 
Ecuador is one of only 17 countries in the world designated 
as “megadiverse” by the World Conservation Monitoring Centre 
of the United Nations Environment Programme.75  Non-
selective herbicide spraying in the region dramatically heigh-
tens the risk to animals and the environment.76  In its Applica-
tion, Ecuador alleges “[a]nimals were . . . hard hit: reported 
deaths of poultry and fish were particularly wide-spread, and 
dogs, horses, cows and other animals also became ill.”77  Ecua-
dor alleges animal deaths and illnesses have a particularly de-
trimental impact on the region’s indigenous populations, who 
rely on the biological diversity of the Amazon jungle for surviv-
al.  Indeed, the importance of biological diversity for indigenous 
peoples is highlighted in the Preamble to the United Nations 
Convention on Biological Diversity (hereinafter, “UNCBD”), to 
which both Ecuador and Colombia are parties, which, “recog-
niz[es] the close and traditional dependence of many indigen-
ous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles on 
biological resources . . .”78
In turning to crops, Ecuador alleges “[a]rea vegetation, in-
cluding local agricultural crops, was devastated.  Yucca, corn, 
rice, plantains, cocoa, coffee and fruit turned brown, became 
desiccated and died.”
  
79
                                                 
75 Id. para. 25. 
  Moreover, in some communities in Su-
cumbios Province, “. . . four years after the spraying began, 
some banana varieties, yucca, maize, fruit trees and aromatic 
herbs have disappeared, or their yield has considerably dimi-
76 Id. para. 25.  Ecuador notes: 
Although it covers only 0.17% of the Earth’s area, Ecuador possesses a 
disproportionately large share of the world’s biodiversity.  In fact, Ec-
uador has the world’s highest biological diversity per area unit. . . Ac-
cording to the World Resources Institute, it has 302 mammal species, 
19, 362 plant species, 640 breeding bird species, 415 reptile species, 434 
amphibian species and 246 fish species (emphasis added) (citing World 
Resources Institute, Ecuador Country Profile, Biodiversity and Pro-
tected Areas, available at http://earthtrends.wri.org). 
77 Id. para. 15. 
78 United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 70. 
79 Application, supra note 1, para. 15. 
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nished.”80  Many complaints have also come from border com-
munities regarding negative health effects as a result of aqua-
tic pollution, citing large herbicide traces in many rivers, in-
cluding the Mira River in Esmeraldas Province.81  As many of 
these border communities use the river for domestic purposes, 
any contamination of the rivers and aquatic life is particularly 
concerning.82
The effects on both animals and crops are exacerbated due 
to the non-selective nature of the herbicides used by Colombia.  
This fact is evident in Colombia, where many of the non-target 
crops include food staples such as plantains, yucca, and corn.
   
83  
According to Ivan Gerardo Geurero, then-governor of Putamayo 
Province, in mid-March 2001 roughly half of the 30,000 hec-
tares affected by the previous weeks’ spraying destroyed basic 
food crops, instead of, or in addition to, illegal coca crops.84  In-
deed, just weeks into Plan Colombia’s aerial fumigations, Pu-
tumayo officials had recorded more than eight hundred cases in 
which legal crops had been destroyed by the spraying.85
iii.  Transboundary Harm to the Environment 
  Thus, 
those animals lucky enough to avoid the affects of direct aerial 
spraying remain at risk of dying from starvation after the her-
bicides destroyed their pastures and contaminated their water 
sources. 
Humans, animals and crops experience the primary effects 
of Colombia’s aerial herbicide spraying, but Ecuador also alleg-
es that the environment suffers from secondary effects.86
                                                 
80 Id. para. 29. 
  The 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Peterson, supra note 18, at 432. 
84 Id.  
85 Id.  
86 Application, supra note 1, para. 27 (“The use of glyphosate-based 
chemical mixture in a tropical climate gives rise to serious risks and uncer-
tainties. . . The effects of glyphosate on this ecological balance are untested . . 
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unintended destruction of food crops increases deforestation in 
the region, and inaccurate spraying results in contamination of 
non-target areas.  Studies have shown offsite drift to be a major 
contributor to unintended environmental harms: 
In terrestrial application of glyphosate, 14 to 78 percent of the 
chemical never reaches the target site.  Helicopter applications 
usually result in 41 to 82 percent offsite drift, and airplane appli-
cation (the prevailing method in Colombia) involves even higher 
rates of drift, as far as 800 meters from the boundaries of target 
areas.87
Indeed, offsite drift is seen by some as one of the most 
harmful results of Colombia’s aerial spraying.  World Wildlife 
Fund Director, Dr. David Olsen, estimated, “[f]or every hectare 
of forest sprayed, another is lost to [pesticide] drift and another 
to additional clearing [to compensate for] displaced crops.”
 
88  
Dr. Olsen also commented, “[t]his spraying campaign is equiva-
lent to the Agent Orange devastation of Vietnam – a distur-
bance of the wildlife and natural ecosystems have never recov-
ered from.”89
Dr. Olsen is not alone in criticizing the aerial spraying 
program’s effects on the environment.  Dr. Luis Naranjo of the 
American Bird Conservancy has advocated for an end to aerial 
fumigation because of the loss of food and plant cover for forest 
dependent birds.  Dr. Naranjo stated “[u]nless the current poli-
cies to face the drug problem in the country are revisited, we 
will be facing the extinction of many of the organisms that 
make [Colombia’s] biota so distinctive.”
  
90  Eduardo Cifuentes, 
the Colombian human rights ombudsman in 2001, agreed with 
Doctors Olsen and Naranjo, and called for an immediate halt to 
aerial herbicide spraying because of the non-selective nature of 
the herbicides being used.91
                                                                                                             
. Colombia’s conduct amounts to a dangerous ecological and toxicological ex-
periment on a vast scale.”).   
 
87 Peterson, supra note 18, at 433. 
88 Id.  
89 Brian Hansen, Colombia’s Environment a Casualty in U.S. War on 
Drugs, ENVIRON. NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 20, 2000, available at http://www.ens-
news.com. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
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C.    Failed Negotiations between Ecuador and Colombia  
Ecuador asserts in its Application that it attempted diplo-
matic settlements to this dispute since the inception of Plan 
Colombia in 2000.92  Conversely, Colombia has, according to 
Ecuador’s Application, shown no interest in addressing Ecua-
dor’s concerns.93  Indeed, when the Government of Panama at-
tempted to mediate the dispute in December 2000, Colombia 
rejected the proposal as “inappropriate and inconvenient.”94  
This attitude continued into the following year, when Colombia 
denied Ecuador’s requests for a 10km “buffer zone” along the 
shared border. 95  When Ecuador complained about the effects 
of the aerial sprayings on its territory in April 2002, Colombia 
allegedly reasserted its disinterest in negotiations, going so far 
as to state that it would not halt what it considered “an irrepla-
ceable instrument for solving the Colombian conflict and alle-
viating the danger that it presents to other countries, in par-
ticular neighbors.”96  A 10km buffer zone was proposed once 
again by Ecuador in July 2003, and was met with the same re-
jection by Colombia in a note dated September 23, 2003.97
Despite a history of disagreement on this issue, some 
progress was made in December 2005 when the two states is-
sued a “joint communiqué in which Colombia agreed temporari-
ly to suspend further sprayings within 10 kilometers of the 
border.”
 
98
                                                 
92 Application, supra note 1, para. 28.  Ecuador cites a note sent by its 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated July 24, 2000 expressing concerns regard-
ing, “the grave impacts on human health and the environment, with possible 
repercussions for Ecuador . . .” 
  This progress in establishing a buffer zone was 
short-lived, however, as Colombia allegedly resumed spraying 
along the border and throughout the buffer zone in December 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. para. 29.  
96 Id. para. 30. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. para. 32. 
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2006.99  Fernando Aruajo Perdomo, Colombia’s Minister of For-
eign Affairs, stated Colombia’s evasive stance on the issue in 
May 2007, and a final Joint Scientific Commission failed to 
reach an agreement shortly thereafter.100 Ecuador informed 
Colombia on July 27, 2007 that it considered the dialogue ex-
hausted,101 and on March 31, 2008 Ecuador submitted its Ap-
plication Instituting Proceedings.102
III.    ICJ JURISPRUDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
 
A.    The First Two “Waves” of ICJ Jurisprudence 
Before turning to an analysis of the Case Concerning Aeri-
al Herbicide Spraying, it is first helpful to ground oneself in a 
brief overview of ICJ jurisprudence in the field of international 
environmental law.  Over the past thirty years, the ICJ has 
played an increasingly important role in contributing to the 
growing body of international environmental law.  These con-
tributions have recently been categorized by Dr. Jorge E. 
Viñuales into two distinct “waves” of jurisprudence.103
i. Corfu Channel and the Nuclear Tests Case 
  The fol-
lowing briefly summarizes Dr. Viñuales’ analysis, and will re-
fer to his terms “first wave” and “second wave,” throughout the 
remainder of this article.   
The “first wave” of ICJ environmental jurisprudence, ac-
cording to Dr. Viñuales, consists of the Corfu Channel case.104
                                                 
99 Id. 
 
100 Id. para. 34.  Mr. Perdomo stated at a meeting of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs on May 28, 2007 that, “Colombia is not in a position to make commit-
ments with respect to the question of the fumigations; nor could it predict 
what decision it will take in the future in this respect.” 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 1. 
103 Dr. Jorge E. Viñuales, The Contribution of the International Court of 
Justice to the Development of International Environmental Law: A Contempo-
rary Assessment, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 232 (2008). 
104 See generally Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9). 
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and the Nuclear Tests case (Astrl. v. Fr.)(N.Z. v. Fr.).105  These 
cases, taken as a whole, recognized the existence of interna-
tional environmental law, but did little in the way of advancing 
it beyond mere recognition.  Dr. Viñuales concludes that, aside 
from confirming previous case law on transboundary damages, 
the first wave’s contribution to international environmental 
law is decidedly ambiguous, hinting at possible customary 
norms but never clearly stating customary rules of internation-
al environmental law.106
[O]n the one hand, the Court made it clear that there was an ob-
ligation on States not to knowingly allow their territory to be 
used for acts contrary to the rights of other states; such obliga-
tion was not explicitly stated with respect to transboundary envi-
ronmental harm, as some had hoped in the context of the Nuclear 
Tests case, but the combination of the Trail Smelter Award, the. . 
.Corfu Channel case, and the suggestions of Judge de Castro in 
his dissenting opinion in the Nuclear Tests case gave a significant 
indication that such a customary obligation was ripe to be as-
serted; on the other hand, this development . . . left aside the 
more fundamental idea that the environment deserved protection 
per se.
  Dr. Viñuales explains: 
107
Thus, the first wave of ICJ jurisprudence did little to explain 
the contents and scope of states’ obligations towards the envi-
ronment.  Its main contribution, according to Dr. Viñuales, was 
twofold: first, a confirmation of previous case law on trans-
boundary damages; second, introducing the notion that States 
have an erga omnes obligation to the environment.
 
108
                                                 
105 See generally Nuclear Tests (Austl. V. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253 (Dec. 20); 
Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457 (Dec. 20); See also Request for an 
Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court’s 
Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 
I.C.J. 288, 319-63 (Sept. 22) (Weeramantry, J., dissenting). 
  This 
foundational first wave gave way to the more explanatory opi-
nions of the second wave. 
106 Viñuales, supra note 103, at 236.   
107 Id. at 243-44. 
108 Id. at 235. 
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ii.  The Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or 
Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros 
Case 
Dr. Viñuales sees the “second wave” of ICJ jurisprudence 
as consolidating and further developing the first wave,109 look-
ing particularly to the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons Advisory Opinion (hereinafter Advisory Opinion) as 
the second wave’s single most important contribution.110  In the 
Advisory Opinion, the ICJ noted that the body of international 
environmental law was not part of the “[m]ost directly relevant 
applicable law governing the question [of whether the threat or 
use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance was permitted un-
der international law],”111
that the environment is under daily threat and that the use of 
nuclear weapons could constitute a catastrophe for the environ-
ment . . .  [t]hat the environment is not an abstraction but 
represents the living space, the quality of life and the very health 
of human beings, including generations unborn.
 but the court did recognize: 
112
The Advisory Opinion gives international environmental law 
the strongest judicial language to date with respect to trans-
boundary pollution:  
   
The existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the envi-
ronment of other States or of areas beyond national control is 
now part of the corpus of international law relating to the envi-
ronment.113
Dr. Viñuales observes two main points from the Advisory 
Opinion: first, that the above-quoted language re-affirms the 
 
                                                 
109 Id. Dr. Viñuales also includes Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru 
(Nauru v. Australia) and Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slova-
kia) in the second wave. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. 
Austl.), 1992 I.C.J. 240, 258 (June 26); Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. 
v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 41 (Sept. 25) (hereinafter “Gabcikovo-Nagymaros 
Project”). 
110 Viñuales, supra note 103, at 244. 
111 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
1996 I.C.J. 226, 243 (July 8). 
112 Id. at 241. 
113 Id. 
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principles recognized in the first wave, and second, that this 
acknowledgment should be taken with a large grain of salt.114  
In its discussion, the court makes express mention of Principles 
21 and 2 of the Stockholm and Rio Declarations, respectively, 
but the court declines to explicitly state whether these prin-
ciples are customary norms.115  Dr. Viñuales astutely observes 
that the phrase “part of the corpus of international law relating 
to the environment” is not equivalent to declaring a rule of cus-
tomary international law.116
Other principles of environmental law, which this request 
enables the Court to recognize and use in reaching its conclu-
sions, are the precautionary principle, the principle of trustee-
ship of earth resources, the principle that the burden of prov-
ing safety lies upon the author of the act complained of, and, 
the ‘polluter pays principle’. . .do not depend for their validity 
on treaty provisions.  They are part of customary international 
law.  They are part of the sine qua non for human survival 
(emphasis added).
  Judge Christopher J. Weeraman-
try, noting the majority’s ambiguous language, exhibited a 
more progressive attitude towards international environmental 
law in his dissenting opinion: 
117
Judge Weeramantry parts with the majority to assert a rule of 
customary international law.  However, this is the view of 
Judge Weeramantry alone, and whether or not a majority of 
the ICJ judiciary will adopt this view in the future remains to 
be seen.  
 
In looking to the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros118
                                                 
114 Viñuales, supra note 103, at 246. 
 case, Dr. 
Viñuales points to dicta that “tend[s] to confirm the customary 
nature of at least part of international environmental law, 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 111, 
at 502-04 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).  
118 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 109.   
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again, without reference to any specific norm.”119
[T]he Court wishes to point out that newly developed norms of 
environmental law are relevant for the implementation of the 
Treaty and that the parties could, by agreement, incorporate 
them through the application of Articles 15, 19 and 20 of the 
Treaty.  These articles do not contain specific obligations of per-
formance but require the parties, in carrying out their obligations 
to ensure that they quality of water in the Danube is not im-
paired and that nature is protected, to take new environmental 
norms into consideration when agreeing upon the means to be 
specified in the Joint Contractual Plan.
  Notably, he 
points to language that speaks to the development of interna-
tional environmental law: 
120
Dr. Viñuales uses this language, and other references in dicta 
and dissenting opinions, to conclude that the general obligation 
of states to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction re-
spect the environment of other states or areas beyond their 
control has become a norm of customary international law.
 
121
B.    The Foundation for Future Transboundary Harm 
Litigation 
   
Whether or not Dr. Viñuales is correct regarding the legal 
status of environmental norms is a matter that has been hotly 
debated among legal scholars.122  What is certain, however, is 
that the ICJ has not yet explicitly addressed the issue in its 
previous opinions. Moreover, the prospect that the Aerial Her-
bicide Spraying case may represent the beginning of a “third 
wave” of environmental case law is a promising one, 123
This article agrees with Dr. Viñuales insofar as it accepts 
the third wave potential of the Aerial Herbicide Spraying case, 
but declines to elevate the dicta and dissenting opinions re-
garding the prohibition of transboundary pollution in the ICJ’s 
 and one 
which this article explores in Part IV, infra.  
                                                 
119 Viñuales, supra note 103, at 248.   
120 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 109, at 67. 
121 Viñuales, supra note 103, at 253.   
122 See generally Daniel Bodansky, Customary (and not so Customary) In-
ternational Environmental Law, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 105 (1995).   
123 Viñuales, supra note 103, at 254-55. 
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international environmental jurisprudence to customary norm 
status.  Indeed, this article argues that the Aerial Herbicide 
Spraying case has the makings of a landmark decision for 
transboundary harm jurisprudence and, by extension, interna-
tional environmental law in general.  Assuming the truth of 
Ecuador’s allegations and considering the inherent environ-
mental issues raised in its Application, this dispute has the po-
tential to be a Trail Smelter of the 21st century in terms of spot-
lighting international environmental law and advancing the 
legal status of its norms.   
Dr. Viñuales observes many facets of international envi-
ronmental law that could be addressed by the court in this 
case, including the contents and enforceability of certain inter-
national environmental rules, the relations between treaty and 
customary international environmental law (if such a thing ex-
ists), and the hierarchy of international environmental law 
compared to other essential interests.124
IV.     A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE CASE CONCERNING 
AERIAL HERBICIDE SPRAYING 
  This article reasons 
that the Aerial Herbicide Spraying case could address the fol-
lowing issues:  first, the contents and enforceability of a state’s 
sic utere duty; and second, the hierarchy of Colombia’s essential 
interest in maintaining internal peace versus Ecuador’s essen-
tial interest in preserving its environment.  In light of these 
two issues, and keeping in mind the historical and jurispruden-
tial backgrounds discussed supra, this article now turns to a 
legal analysis of Ecuador’s transboundary pollution claim 
against Colombia. 
A.    The ICJ’s Jurisdiction Over the Dispute 
Arguably the most glaring criticisms of international envi-
ronmental law’s development stem from the relatively scant 
case law discussed above and the infrequency of environmental 
                                                 
124 Id. at 257. 
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cases successfully brought before the ICJ.125  These jurisdic-
tional critiques express two main concerns:  first, that the ICJ’s 
espousal requirement makes the forum available only to states, 
not to citizens; and second, that both the source state and the 
affected state must first consent to the ICJ’s jurisdiction before 
a case may be heard.126
i. American Treaty on Pacific Settlement of Disputes (Pact 
of Bogotá) 
  The unique facts of the Case Concern-
ing Aerial Herbicide Spraying, however, do not present either 
of these problems.  Here, Ecuador has chosen to submit its Ap-
plication espousing claims of transboundary harm made by Ec-
uadorian citizens, precisely the type of action that many critics 
of the espousal requirement fear would never occur.  Further-
more, Ecuador points to two multilateral treaties to which both 
the source state (Colombia) and the affected state (Ecuador) 
are parties, explicitly providing for compulsory jurisdiction be-
fore the ICJ.  The following briefly analyzes these two treaties 
and their jurisdictional provisions. 
The American Treaty on Pacific Settlement of Disputes 
(hereinafter “Pact of Bogotá”) was signed by both Ecuador and 
Colombia on April 30, 1948, and entered into force on May 6, 
1948.127  Colombia ratified the treaty on April 29, 1974.128
                                                 
125 See generally Bryan L. Salamone, The Absence of an Operational Lia-
bility Scheme for Transfrontier Environmental Harm Resulting in Injuries to 
Persons, 5 TOURO INT’L L. REV. 1 (1994). 
  Pur-
126 Id. at 14; see also International Court of Justice, Basis for the Court’s 
Jurisdiction, http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction.  The footnote to the website 
details the consent requirement as follows: 
The jurisdiction of the Court in contentious proceedings is based on the 
consent of the States to which it is open. . . In the following eight cases, 
the Court found that it could take no further steps upon an Application 
in which it was admitted that the opposing party did not accept its ju-
risdiction: Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft and Crew of the United 
States of America (U.S. v. U.S.S.R.), 1954 I.C.J. 102, 105 (July 12); 
Aerial Incident of 10 Mar. 1953 (U.S. v. Czech.), 1956 I.C.J. 6 (Mar. 14); 
Antarctica (U.K. v. Arg.), 1956 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 16); Aerial Incident of 7 
Oct. 1952 (U.S. v. U.S.S.R.), 1956 I.C.J. 9 (Mar. 14); Aerial Incident of 4 
September 1954 (U.S. v. U.S.S.R.), 1958 I.C.J. 158 (Dec. 9);  and Aerial 
Incident of 7 Nov. 1954 (U.S. v. U.S.S.R.), 1959 I.C.J. 276 (Oct. 7). 
127 American Treaty on the Pacific Settlement of Disputes “Pact of Bo-
gotá,” Apr. 30, 1948, 30 U.N.T.S. 55 (hereinafter “Pact of Bogotá”), available 
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suant to Article II of the Pact of Bogotá, the parties have a gen-
eral obligation to settle international controversies by regional 
pacific means.129  If a dispute between the parties cannot be 
settled by direct negotiations, “the parties bind themselves to 
use the procedures established in the present Treaty, in the 
manner and under the conditions provided for in the following 
articles . . .”130
Ecuador bases the ICJ’s jurisdiction over the dispute on 
Article XXXI, which provides: 
 Assuming the allegations made by Ecuador in 
its Application are true regarding the lengthy and unsuccessful 
attempts to negotiate a diplomatic settlement to the trans-
boundary dispute, it appears that the obligation to attempt re-
gional negotiations pursuant to Article II has been exhausted.   
In conformity with Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, the High Contracting Parties dec-
lare that they recognize, in relation to any other American State, 
the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory ipso facto, without the 
necessity of any special agreement so long as the present Treaty 
is in force, in all disputes of a juridical nature that arise among 
them concerning: (a) The interpretation of a treaty; (b) Any ques-
tion of international law; (c) The existence of any fact which, if 
established, would constitute the breach of an international obli-
gation; (d) The nature or extent of the reparation to be made for 
the breach of an international obligation.131
This provision explicitly grants the ICJ compulsory jurisdiction 
over “[a]ny question of international law,”
 
132 and “[t]he exis-
tence of any fact which, if established, would constitute the 
breach of an international obligation,”133
                                                                                                             
at http://treaties.un.org.   
 both of which present 
themselves in the Aerial Herbicide Spraying case.   
128 See id.    
129 Id. art. II. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at Art. XXXI.  See also Application, supra note 1, at 6, para. 7. 
132 Pact of Bogotá, supra note 127, art. XXXI. 
133 Id. 
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Thus, assuming the obligation to negotiate a regional set-
tlement to the dispute has in fact been exhausted by the par-
ties, Ecuador can claim the ICJ possesses compulsory jurisdic-
tion over the dispute pursuant to Article XXXI of the Pact of 
Bogotá. 
ii. 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic 
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988 
U.N. Drug Convention) 
Ecuador also points to a provision in the 1988 United Na-
tions Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances (hereinafter “1988 U.N. Drug Conven-
tion”) as another source of the ICJ’s jurisdiction over the Aerial 
Herbicide Spraying dispute.134  Ecuador ratified the 1988 U.N. 
Drug Convention on March 23, 1990, and Colombia ratified the 
treaty four years later, on June 10, 1994.135  Pursuant to Ar-
ticle 29(1), the 1988 U.N. Drug Convention entered into force 
on November 11, 1990136  The Convention makes specific refer-
ence to the “coca bush”137 and it is likely that the Plan Colom-
bia sprayings in dispute fall within the scope of the Conven-
tion, which “address[es] more effectively the various aspects of 
illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances hav-
ing an international dimension.”138
Article 32 of the 1988 U.N. Drug Convention, entitled “Set-
tlement of Disputes,” imposes an obligation on the parties to 
consult by peaceful processes.
 
139
                                                 
134 Application, supra note 1, at 7-8, para. 8. 
  Ecuador cites to Article 32, 
paragraph 2 in its Application as a source of the ICJ’s compul-
sory jurisdiction over the dispute: 
135 See United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 164, 28 
I.L.M. 493 (1989). 
136 Id. art. 29.  Article 29 provides “This Convention shall enter into force 
on the ninetieth day after the date of the deposit with the Secretary-General 
of the twentieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession 
by States. . .” Id.  
137 Id. art. 1(c) (defining coca bush as “the plant of any species of the ge-
nus Erythroxylon”). 
138 Id. art. 2, para. 1. 
139 Id.  
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Any such dispute which cannot be settled in the manner pre-
scribed in paragraph 1 of this article shall be referred, at the re-
quest of any one of the States Parties to the dispute, to the Inter-
national Court of Justice for decision.140
Assuming that the two parties have exhausted peaceful bila-
teral and regional negotiations, it appears that Ecuador is also 
correct in basing the Court’s jurisdiction in Article 32 of the 
1988 U.N. Drug Convention. 
 
B.  Ecuador’s Transboundary Harm Claim 
Having confirmed the ICJ’s jurisdiction over the Aerial 
Herbicide Spraying case, this article now turns to the main 
elements necessary for Ecuador to prove its transboundary 
harm claim.  In conducting this analysis, the ICJ will have a 
perfect opportunity to utilize the work of the International Law 
Commission (hereinafter, “ILC”); namely, the 2001 Draft Ar-
ticles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazard-
ous Activities (hereinafter, “Draft Articles on Prevention”).141  
Pursuant to Article 13, paragraph 1(a) of the Charter of the 
United Nations, 142 the ILC’s Draft Articles on Prevention 
represents nearly three decades of work focusing specifically on 
transboundary environmental harm, culminating with the 
adoption of the Draft Articles on Prevention by the ILC at its 
fifty-third session in 2001.143  The ICJ has referred to the high-
ly respected work of the ILC in declaring new norms of custo-
mary international law in prior opinions,144
                                                 
140 Id. art. 2, para. 2. 
 and the Aerial 
141 Draft articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous 
Activities, with commentary, in Report of the International Law Commission, 
Fifty-third Session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN DOC. A/56/10 
(2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles on Prevention]. 
142 U.N. Charter art. 13, para. 1 (providing that the General Assembly 
shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of encour-
aging the progressive development of international law and codification). 
143 See generally Draft Articles on Prevention, supra note 141. 
144 See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 118; discussion, infra 
Part C (discussing the elevation of the ILC’s Article 33 on State responsibility 
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Herbicide Spraying case provides yet another opportunity for 
the ICJ to declare the work of the ILC as custom.  The Draft 
Articles on Prevention embrace the sic utere principle in Article 
3, which states: “The State of origin shall take all appropriate 
measures to prevent significant transboundary harm or at any 
event to minimize the risk thereof.”145  With the principle of sic 
utere firmly entrenched in Article 3, and the language of Prin-
ciple 21 of the Stockholm Declaration quoted in comment 1 to 
Article 3, 146 the ICJ is afforded the opportunity to elevate the 
much-debated sic utere principle to customary norm status and 
in the process give content to what has been a frustratingly 
ambiguous normative principle.147
Article 1 defines the scope of the Draft Articles on Preven-
tion as applying to “activities not prohibited by international 
law which involve a risk of causing significant transboundary 
harm through their physical consequences.”
  
148  The comments 
following Article 1 emphasize four basic criteria an activity 
must meet in order to fall within the scope of the Draft Articles 
on Prevention, to wit: “activities not prohibited by international 
law,”149 “territory, jurisdiction, and control,”150 “risk of causing 
significant transboundary harm,”151
                                                                                                             
to customary international law).   
 and “physical conse-
145 Draft Articles on Prevention, supra note 141, art. 3. 
146 Id. art. 3, cmt. 1 (stating, “Article 3 is based on the fundamental prin-
ciple sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which is reflected in Principle 21 of 
the Stockholm Declaration, reading: 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and 
the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their 
own natural resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, 
and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction 
or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of 
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction”). 
147 For an optimistic view of sic utere as custom, see Günther Handl, 
Transboundary Impacts, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 531, 533-43 (Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunée, & Ellen 
Hey eds., 2007).  For more skeptical views of sic utere’s status as custom, see 
Bodansky, supra note 122; see also John K. Knox, The Myth and Reality of 
Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 291 
(2002). 
148 Draft Articles on Prevention, supra note 141, art. 1. 
149 Id. art. 1, cmt. 6. 
150 Id. art. 1, cmt. 7, 8. 
151 Id. art. 1, cmt. 13. 
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quences.”152
i. Activities Not Prohibited by International Law 
  The following will analyze each of these four crite-
ria in turn.  
The ILC commentary makes clear that the drafters in-
tended this first criterion to create adistinction between inter-
national liability and State responsibility.  Thus, an action 
prohibited by international law subjects a State to internation-
al liability, whereas an action not prohibited by international 
law will only raise the issue of State responsibility.  The action 
at issue in the Aerial Herbicide Spraying case is Colombia’s 
aerial fumigation campaign, an action that is not prohibited by 
any international law.  Indeed, States enjoy the freedom to 
conduct aerial fumigations within their territory, and Colombia 
has made use of this tactic to battle narco-terrorist groups for 
decades.153
ii. Territory, Jurisdiction and Control 
  Thus, the actions of Colombia are not prohibited by 
international law, raising the issue of State responsibility, and 
therefore satisfy the first criterion of Article 1. 
The second criterion is that the actions “are planned or are 
carried out”154 in the territory or otherwise under the jurisdic-
tion or control of a State of origin.  The Draft Articles on Pre-
vention emphasize the importance of the territorial link be-
tween the actions and the State of origin,155
                                                 
152 Id. art. 1, cmt. 16, 17. 
 and describe 
153 Application, supra note 1, at 8, para. 10. 
154 Draft Articles on Prevention, supra note 141, Art. 2(d) defines the 
“State of origin” as the “[S]tate in the territory or otherwise under the juris-
diction or control of which the activities referred to in Article 1 are planned or 
are carried out.” 
155 Id. art. 1, cmt. 7 (recognizing that “Even though the expression ‘juris-
diction or control of a State’ is a more commonly used formula in some in-
struments, the Commission finds it useful to mention also the concept of ‘ter-
ritory’ in order to emphasize the importance of the territorial link, when such 
a link exists, between activities under these articles and a State”). 
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territorial jurisdiction as the “dominant criterion.”156
iii. Risk of Causing Significant Transboundary Harm 
  In the 
Aerial Herbicide Spraying case, it is apparent that the actions 
at issue occurred within Colombia’s territorial jurisdiction, and 
operated under the control of the Colombia government.  It is 
undisputed that Colombia’s domestic counter-narcotics policy 
was aimed at coca cultivation in its southern regions, operated 
by the Colombian Army and other Colombian forces.  Even if 
Colombian forces and herbicide spray crossed the border, tech-
nically outside of the Colombia’s territorial jurisdiction, Colom-
bia’s actions remained under the control of the Colombian gov-
ernment and thus the entirety of the Plan Colombia sprayings 
falls under the ambit of the second criterion.  In other words, 
the actions at issue were planned and carried out by the Co-
lombian government, and thus, the second criterion is easily 
satisfied. 
The term “risk of causing significant transboundary harm” 
157 is defined in Article 2 of the Draft Principles on Prevention 
as “risks taking the form of a high probability of causing signif-
icant transboundary harm and a low probability of causing dis-
astrous transboundary harm.”158  In stressing the objective na-
ture of “risk,” the comments provide that “[t]he mere fact that 
harm eventually results from an activity does not mean that 
the activity involved a risk,” and conversely, that an activity 
may involve a risk even though the State of origin underesti-
mated the risk or was unaware of the risk.159  In turning to the 
term “significant,” the drafters note that the term is not with-
out ambiguity, and advise that determining what constitutes 
“significant” is a decision to be made on a case-by-case basis.160
                                                 
156 Id. art. 1, cmt. 8. 
  
However, the commentary does offer some guidance in deter-
mining what is meant by the term “significant”:  “It is to be un-
157 Id. art. 1. 
158 Id. art. 2(a). 
159 Id. art. 1, cmt. 14 
160Draft Articles on Prevention, in Report of the International Law 
Commission on the work of its fifty-third session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. 
No. 10, UN DOC. A/56/10 (2001). 
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derstood that ‘significant’ is something more than ‘detectable’ 
but need not be at the level of ‘serious’ or ‘substantial.’”161
In the Aerial Herbicide Spraying case, it appears that the 
imprecise nature of aerial fumigations, including the tendency 
to create significant off-site drift, the non-selective nature of 
the chemical herbicide spray employed by Colombia, and the 
close proximity to Ecuador’s border all weigh heavily in Ecua-
dor’s favor when considering the risk of significant transboun-
dary harm.  Taken objectively, it is clear that conducting such a 
massive and inherently inaccurate fumigation campaign so 
near to an international border necessarily involves a degree of 
risk.  Furthermore, such a large-scale fumigation campaign is 
also likely to have a significant impact on the environment, es-
pecially considering the unparalleled ecological diversity of the 
Amazonian region at issue.  Scholars tackling the issue of “sig-
nificant harm,” particularly Günther Handl, posit that certain 
types of transboundary effects involving toxic or otherwise 
dangerous substances affecting public health “are likely to be a 
priori deemed significantly harmful.”
  
162  Handl also notes that 
the use of geographical markers, especially the proximity of the 
causal activity to the border, may be prima facie indicators of 
the significance of the transboundary activity.163
iv. Physical Consequences 
  Given the 
facts of the current dispute, is likely the ICJ would find that a 
risk did indeed exist, and that the risk was significant.  Indeed, 
it is easy to imagine the Plan Colombia sprayings onto Ecuado-
rian territory discussed in Part II, supra, as textbook examples 
of actions constituting a risk of causing significant transboun-
dary harm.   
The Draft Articles on Prevention emphasize that the phys-
ical link criterion must connect the action with its transboun-
                                                 
161 Id.  
162 Handl, supra note 147, at 536. 
163 Id. 
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dary effects, implying that the actions must themselves have a 
“physical quality, and the consequences must flow from that 
quality.”164
The physical quality of the aerial fumigations is self-
evident, however the consequences that flow from this activity 
are more difficult to prove.  In attempting to do so, Ecuador can 
point to the twelve instances it cites in its Application
  Thus, Ecuador must show that Colombia’s spray-
ing of non-selective herbicides onto hundreds of thousands of 
hectares of Amazonian jungle in and around the Ecuadorian 
border have a physical quality, and the consequences alleged in 
its Application flow from that physical quality.  
165 as ex-
amples of the relationship the Plan Colombia sprayings have 
had to injuries to Ecuadorian citizens and territory.  Ecuador 
can also emphasize the deleterious effects the sprayings have 
had on its indigenous populations.166  The plight of the Awá is a 
particularly effective example in this case, as the Awá and oth-
er indigenous populations suffer physically, culturally and 
agriculturally from the sprayings, all of which have been con-
firmed by the U.N. Special Rapporteur.167
However, this final criterion is likely to be Ecuador’s big-
gest hurdle in maintaining a valid claim of transboundary 
harm against Colombia.   Satisfying the physical consequences 
prong will require a more thorough comparison of the precise 
times and locations of the Plan Colombia sprayings and the 
corresponding harms alleged by Ecuador in its Application.  In 
order to present a sufficient factual basis establishing a causal 
relationship, Ecuador must do more than generalize dates and 
harms.  Ecuador alludes to the fact that it may have more do-
cumented instances of transboundary harms in its Application, 
but the Application itself lacks an exhaustive comparison be-
tween the approximate time periods during which the harms 
allegedly occurred and the time and location of the Plan Co-
lombia sprayings.  Indeed, this data may be highly controver-
sial, as it will tend to show the true merit of the allegations.  
Moreover, Colombia’s refusal to disclose the exact chemical 
 
                                                 
164 Draft Articles on Prevention, supra note 141, art. 1, cmt. 17. 
165 Application, supra note 1, at 12, para. 17. 
166 Id. at 16, para. 24. 
167 Id. at 18, para. 30-33.  
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makeup of its herbicide mixture and the dearth of independent 
scientific evidence regarding the effects of glyphosate-
surfactant compounds on humans, animals and the environ-
ment leaves much to be desired in the way of hard facts.  
The widespread accounts of environmental damage in and 
around the border region and the absence  of any alternative 
cause of the alleged  environmental damage leads one to  con-
clude , at this preliminary stage, that Ecuador will likely satis-
fy the physical connection criterion of the Court’s analysis.  
Thus, in the event the ICJ recognizes the Draft Articles on 
Prevention as reflecting customary international law, one could 
safely proceed under the assumption that all four criteria con-
tained in the scope provision of Article 1 will be met in this dis-
pute.  As Colombia’s actions lie within the scope of the Draft 
Articles on Prevention, they are rendered susceptible to a valid 
claim that it violated its obligation of prevention pursuant to 
Article 3.   
v. The Draft Articles’ “Harmonious Ensemble”168
After concluding that the actions taken by Colombia in-
volved a risk of causing significant transboundary harm, the 
question then becomes what approach the ICJ would take in 
attempting to enforce Article 3.  To the extent the ICJ will dec-
lare Article 3 customary international law, it will tackle a deci-
dedly amorphous principle of international environmental law.  
In discussing the Draft Articles on Prevention, Prof. John Knox 
noted the existence of both procedural requirements and subs-
tantive obligations, specifically "that the Draft Articles present 
their procedural obligations as though their primary purpose 
was to facilitate compliance with this [substantive] obliga-
tion.”
 of 
Substance and Procedure  
169
                                                 
168 Draft Articles on Prevention, supra note 141, art. 3, cmt. 4. 
  While it is possible that the ICJ might address both 
169 Knox, supra note 147, at 310; see also Handl, supra note 147, at 540-
42 (describing Article 3 as the Draft Articles’ key substantive provision, and 
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the procedural and substantive elements of the Draft Articles, 
it is more likely that the Court will focus on one or the other in 
seeking a rationale for its opinion.170
Article 3 and Substantive Obligations 
 
In choosing to focus on the substantive meaning of Article 
3, the ICJ could simply apply the “significant harm” standard 
to the particular facts of the Aerial Herbicide Spraying case.  
Given the current allegations,  it is conceivable that the ICJ 
could take Günther Handl’s approach of recognizing certain 
toxic and highly dangerous activities as significantly harmful 
per se.  In other words, the court may conclude that the trans-
boundary harms affected on Ecuador rise to a substantive level 
beyond what any reasonable interpretation of “significant 
harm” will allow, and that Colombia’s actions, regardless of due 
diligence,171
While this is an unlikely outcome, a decision taking such a 
hard-line substantive stance on this issue would constitute a 
watershed moment for international environmental law, as it 
would be the first time that the ICJ addresses the substantive 
aspect of the sic utere principle.  It would also force the court 
and international legal scholars to grapple with the state prac-
tice and opinio juris elements of such a customary rule of in-
ternational law.  In the event the ICJ takes this approach, it 
would give much-needed context to the principle of prevention, 
providing future transboundary harm disputes with a basis for 
comparison.  More importantly, it would also signal a warning 
 are so repugnant to sic utere that they are per se 
violations of Article 3.   
                                                                                                             
identifying the duties to cooperate (Art. 4), assess (Art. 7), notify and inform 
(Art. 8) and consult (Art. 9, 10) as the Draft Articles’ procedural provisions). 
170 Handl, supra note 147, at 542 (explaining that in the Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros Project, the ICJ relied heavily on its interpretation of a State’s 
procedural obligations under international environmental law as a specific 
consequence of a State’s obligation to cooperate and prevent environmental 
harm).  
171 Draft Articles on Prevention, supra note 141, art. 3, cmt. 7 (“The obli-
gation of the State of origin to take preventive or minimization measures is 
one of due diligence.  It is the conduct of the State of origin that will deter-
mine whether the State has complied with its obligations under the present 
articles.”). 
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to all States currently engaged in significant transboundary 
pollution that certain activities are likely to be a priori deemed 
significantly harmful and, therefore, susceptible to claims for 
damages pursuant to rules of customary international law. 
Articles 9 and 10 and Procedural Obligations 
Alternatively, the ICJ could focus on Colombia’s procedural 
obligations with respect to the Draft Articles on Prevention.  
One possibility is that the court could declare the contents of 
Articles 9 and 10, requiring consultation of the parties and list-
ing factors involved in an equitable balance of states’ interests, 
respectively, as reflecting customary international law.  Thus,  
in the event Article 3 is recognized as custom,  Articles 9 and 
10 will likely follow suit for two main reasons.  First, it would 
align the court’s interpretation with the intentions of the draf-
ters, as the commentary to Article 3 makes clear that the draf-
ters envisioned the three articles complementing each other.172
Article 9 requires States to enter into “consultations. . . 
with a view to achieving acceptable solutions regarding meas-
ures to be adopted in order to prevent significant transboun-
dary harm or at any event to minimize the risk thereof.”
  
Second, it makes sense as a practical matter.  In order to avoid 
arbitrary and capricious judgments resulting from attempts to 
enforce the substance of Article 3 without any supporting pro-
cedural obligations, it is necessary to recognize a framework for 
good faith consultations by which states may be held accounta-
ble.  Therefore, for the purposes of the following analysis, it is 
relatively safe to extend the assumption of Article 3’s recogni-
tion as customary international law to Articles 9 and 10. 
173
                                                 
172 Id. art. 3, cmt. 4 (“Articles 3 is complementary to articles 9 and 10 and 
together they constitute a harmonious ensemble”). 
  The 
following paragraph makes specific reference to Article 10, list-
ing factors involved in an equitable balance of interest, in order 
173 Id. art. 9(1).   
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to guide the dialogue between the States.174  The equitable fac-
tors in Article 10 include: the degree of risk of significant 
transboundary harm,175 the availability of means of preventing 
such harm,176 the importance of the activity for the state of ori-
gin,177 the degree to which the state of origin and the affected 
state are prepared to pay for prevention,178 the economic viabil-
ity of the action in relation to the costs of prevention and the 
possibility of conducting the activity by other means,179 and fi-
nally and perhaps most interestingly, the standards of preven-
tion which the likely affected state would apply to the same ac-
tions.180  As Prof. Knox has noted, these procedural obligations 
fall short of bestowing a right of veto on the potentially affected 
state,181 and also fail to ensure the participation of the affected 
state or the public in the preparation of an environmental im-
pact assessment.182
Steps in compliance [with procedural obligations] are important 
pointers in the determination of whether or not the source State 
has acted diligently in discharging its substantive obligation to 
prevent the transboundary impact concerned.  At the same time, 
it is equally clear that the procedural obligations themselves do 
not imply any obligation for the source State to restrain or limit 
  These shortcomings, however, do not rend-
er the procedural provisions of the Draft Articles on Prevention 
completely toothless.  Conversely, in arguing that the basic 
procedural obligations of assessment, notification, and consul-
tation already reflect customary international law, Handl 
points out that States disregard these obligations at their own 
risk: 
                                                 
174 Id. art. 9(2). 
175 Draft Articles on Prevention, supra note 141, art. 10(a). 
176 Id. 
177 Id. art. 10(b). 
178 Id. art. 10(d). 
179 Id. art. 10(e). 
180 Id. art. 10(f). 
181 Knox, supra note 147, at 310; see also Draft Articles on Prevention, 
supra note 141, art. 9, cmt. 2. 
182 Knox, supra note 147, at 310 (noting, conversely, that the Draft Ar-
ticles on Prevention does include a strong equal access provision, which 
would ensure that nonresidents exposed to the risk of significant transboun-
dary harm enjoy the same procedural rights as the public of the State of ori-
gin, whatever those rights may be). 
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the transboundary impact-creating conduct or project.183
In Aerial Herbicide Spraying, the ICJ could revisit the 
failed negotiations between Ecuador and Colombia in search of 
conduct that comports with the good faith and due diligence re-
quirement of Article 9
 
184 and addresses the relevant factors 
listed in Article 10.  It is clear from Ecuador’s Application that 
it feels Colombia never truly engaged in good faith consulta-
tions,185
Alternatively, the court could find Colombia did meet its 
obligations to engage in good faith consultations under Article 
9(1), but that the consultations fell short of considering all the 
relevant Article 10 factors pursuant to Article 9(2).  Of particu-
lar interest to this dispute is the Article 10(e) factor – the “eco-
nomic viability of the activity in relation to the costs of preven-
tion and to the possibility of carrying out the activity elsewhere 
or by other means or replacing it with an alternative activity.”
 and it is possible that the ICJ would find little evi-
dence of good faith or due diligence on Colombia’s part.  Such a 
conclusion would likely result in the court ordering the parties 
to return to consultations, with the specific factors laid out in 
Article 10 in mind, before rendering an opinion on the remain-
ing issues in the case.   
186
The words “carrying out the activity. . . by other means” intend to 
take into account, for example, a situation in which one type of 
chemical substance used in the activity, which might be the 
source of transboundary harm, could be replaced by another 
chemical substance. . . The words “replacing [the activity] with 
  
The commentary to this factor explains: 
                                                 
183 Handl, supra note 147, at 543. 
184 Draft Articles on Prevention, supra note 141, art. 9, cmt. 2-4. 
185 Application, supra note 1, para. 5 (stating, “Even on the occasions 
when Ecuador thought it had reached agreement with Colombia to put an 
end to the aerial sprayings, the fumigations subsequently resumed.  It is 
therefore plain that the attitude of Colombia makes impossible for the Par-
ties’ dispute to be settled by diplomatic means”). 
 
186 Draft Articles on Prevention, supra note 141, art. 10(e) (emphasis 
added). 
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an alternative activity” are intended to take account of the possi-
bility that the same or comparable results may be reached by 
another activity with no risk, or lower risk, of significant trans-
boundary harm.187
This factor in particular seems to speak to the most obvious 
problem of Aerial Herbicide Spraying; namely, Colombia’s use 
of non-selective and scientifically untested herbicide mixtures.  
It is entirely possible that effective, yet selective and environ-
mentally safe, herbicides could be employed in the same fumi-
gation regime.  Furthermore, it is conceivable that entirely dif-
ferent activities apart from aerial spraying might have the 
same or comparable results to Plan Colombia fumigations.  
While this is only one factor among many, it seems especially 
relevant to this dispute.  Again, in this scenario, the ICJ could 
order the parties to return to negotiations with the Article 10 
equitable factors serving as the main framework for future con-
sultations.   
  
In sum, the likelihood that the ICJ will address the legal 
status of the ILC’s Draft Articles on Prevention has never been 
greater.  Aerial Herbicide Spraying provides the court with a 
favorable set of facts to conduct an analysis of a valid trans-
boundary harm claim.  It is nearly certain that Colombia’s ac-
tions would fall within the scope of the Draft Articles on Pre-
vention, giving the ICJ the opportunity to address both 
substantive and procedural aspects of Article 3’s principle of 
prevention.  This article acknowledges that a hard-line subs-
tantive approach is plausible, but reasons that the court is 
more likely to focus on procedure by incorporating the so-called 
“harmonious ensemble” of Articles 9 and 10 into Article 3’s 
substantive norm of customary international law.  In doing so, 
the ICJ could not only afford the parties another chance to re-
solve the dispute amicably, but also could shed some light on 
the procedural obligations of States seeking to meet due dili-
gence and good faith standards in future transboundary harm 
consultations.     
                                                 
187 Id. art. 10, cmt. 12. 
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C.  Colombia’s State of Necessity Defense 
Extending the analysis beyond Ecuador’s transboundary 
harm claim assumes that the ICJ has recognized Colombia’s 
actions as violations of its substantive or procedural obliga-
tions, or that Colombia has admitted to violating its substan-
tive or procedural obligations in favor of advocating a state of 
necessity defense.  This analysis  begins acknowledging the li-
kelihood that Colombia will vigorously deny that its actions 
constitute a breach of its sic utere duty, and that Colombia will 
attack Ecuador’s claims of a causal relationship between the 
conduct an the injury.  However, as the central premise of this 
analysis is to take all of Ecuador’s claims as true, this article 
has concluded that it is unlikely Colombia will prevail in ar-
guing for its compliance with its substantive or procedural ob-
ligations of prevention pursuant to the Draft Articles on Pre-
vention.  This article asks if there a stronger, more compelling 
defense available to Colombia than to simply deny the ele-
ments of a successful transboundary harm claim.  The short 
answer is yes.  Colombia’s best defense is to assert a state of 
necessity, excusing it from breaching its international obliga-
tions because it acted to protect its essential interest in main-
taining internal peace. 
i. The Modern Necessity Doctrine 
In keeping with the limited focus of this article on ICJ juri-
sprudence, it is best to introduce the modern doctrine of neces-
sity in the same context.  This approach points one to the 
aforementioned Gabcikovo-Nagymaros188 case.  Prior to Gabci-
kovo-Nagymaros, the ICJ had yet to speak on the status of Ar-
ticle 33 of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility (he-
reinafter Draft Articles on Responsibility).189
                                                 
188 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 118. 
  The Draft 
189 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, art. 33, paras. 1-2: 
1. A state of necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for 
precluding the wrongfulness of an act of that State not in conformity 
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Articles on Responsibility, promulgated by Professor Roberto 
Ago, diverge from the traditional view of the doctrine of neces-
sity, which views the defense arising solely from a state’s inhe-
rent right to self-preservation.190  Instead, the Draft Articles on 
Responsibility adopts a modern view of necessity as “an excuse 
to breach a state’s international obligation when necessary to 
protect an essential interest.”191
ii. The ICJ and “Essential Interests” 
  Thus, the Draft Articles on 
Responsibility broaden the scope of the necessity doctrine to in-
clude circumstances in which a state is legitimately protecting 
any essential interest, not simply its right to existence. 
In Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, the ICJ explicitly laid out the 
judicial framework for a state of necessity analysis.  The court 
outlined the requirements for a valid claim of necessity as fol-
lows:  
In the present case, the following basic conditions set forth in 
Draft Article 33 are relevant: it must have been occasioned by an 
“essential interest” of the State which is the author of the act con-
flicting with one of its international obligations; that interest 
must have been threatened by a “grave and imminent peril”; the 
                                                                                                             
with an international obligation of the State unless: 
(a) the act was the only means of safeguarding an essential interest 
of the State against a grave and imminent peril; and (b) the act did 
not seriously impair an essential interest of the State towards which 
the obligation existed. 
2. In any case, a state of necessity may not be invoked by a State as a 
ground for precluding wrongfulness: (a) if the international obligation 
with which the act of the State is not in conformity arises out of a pe-
remptory norm of general international law; or (b) if the international 
obligation with which the act of the State is not in conformity is laid 
down by a treaty which, explicitly or implicitly, excludes the possibility 
of invoking the state of necessity with respect to that obligations; or (c) 
if the State in question has contributed to the occurrence of the state of 
necessity. 
190 Roman Boed, State of Necessity as a Justification for Internationally 
Wrongful Conduct, 3 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 7 (2000); see also Andreas 
Laursen, The Use of Force and (The State of) Necessity, 37 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 485, 490-94 (2004) (describing the work of the International 
Law Commission and Professor Ago in promulgating the Draft Articles). 
191Boed, supra note 190, at 7.   
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act being challenged must have been the “only means” of safe-
guarding that interest; that act must not have “seriously im-
pair[ed] an essential interest” of the State towards which the ob-
ligation existed; and the State which is the author of that act 
must not have “contributed to the occurrence of the state of ne-
cessity”.  Those conditions reflect customary international law.192
Here, the court makes clear that it adopts the modern view of 
the doctrine of necessity set forth in Article 33 of the Draft Ar-
ticles, and explicitly recognizes Article 33 as reflecting custo-
mary international law.  This modern view accepts that any es-
sential interest may lay a foundation for a state of necessity 
defense, but this begs the question of what constitutes an “es-
sential interest?”    The ILC Commentaries decline to enume-
rate essential interests and stress that the extent of an inter-
est’s “essential” quality is left to a case-by-case analysis.
 
193
Professor Ago, however, provided examples of the type of 
interests that would satisfy Article 33’s essential interest re-
quirement in his own report, to wit: “. . . political or economic 
survival, the continued functioning of [a state’s] essential ser-
vices, the maintenance of internal peace, the survival of a sec-
tor of [a state’s] population, and the preservation of the envi-
ronment or [a state’s] territory or a part thereof.”
   
194  The 2001 
ILC Commentary provides a similar list.195
                                                 
192 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 118, at 40-41, para. 52. 
  To underscore the 
adoption of this modern view, the ICJ had no problem recogniz-
ing that the threat of ecological disaster could establish a state 
of necessity, falling under the ambit of “preservation of the en-
193 Boed, supra note 190, at 15 (citing Report on the International Law 
Commission on the Work of its Thirty-Second Session, U.N. 
DOC.A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/ADD.1 (1980)); see also Laursen, supra note 190, at 
502.   
194 Roberto Ago, Addendum to the Eighth Report on State Responsibility, 
para. 2, U.N. DOC.A/CN.4/318/ADD.5-7 (1980); see also Boed, supra note 190, 
at 15. 
195 Laursen, supra note 190, at 502-03 (citing JAMES CRAWFORD, THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY; 
INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARY (2002)). 
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vironment or its territory or a part thereof.”196  Indeed, the ICJ 
went on to state “the great significance that [the ICJ] attaches 
to respect for the environment, not only for States but also for 
the whole of mankind.”197
iii. Analyzing Colombia’s State of Necessity Defense 
 
The ICJ made clear in Gabcikovo-Nagymaros that a state 
of necessity defense is available only if the state accused of vi-
olating international law can meet all of the requirements im-
posed by the narrow exception carved out in Article 33 of the 
Draft Articles.  This section will address each of the elements of 
a necessity claim in turn, to wit: an essential interest, a grave 
and imminent peril threatening that essential interest, the vi-
olation of international law as the only available means to pro-
tect that imperiled essential interest, and the balancing re-
quirement of the protected interest and the essential interest of 
a State towards which the obligation was owed. 
“Essential Interests” 
Both the modern and the traditional views of the doctrine 
of necessity agree that a State’s self-preservation constitutes 
an essential interest.198  Colombia may attempt to frame its es-
sential interest in these terms, arguing that it has waged a 
decades-long internal war against narcotic-funded terrorist 
groups, like the FARC, and that these groups put the very exis-
tence of Colombia’s government at risk.  Indeed, some reports 
indicate that, at one time, “the conflict ha[d] left as much as 
40% of the country under the de facto control of major narco-
terrorist groups.”199
                                                 
196 Boed, supra note 190, at 14.  (“The Court proceeded on the assumption 
that the threat of an ecological catastrophe could establish a state of necessi-
ty, and that such necessity could provide a valid excuse for a State’s conduct 
in violation of its international obligations.”). 
  This interest, however, may not be the 
most persuasive essential interest Colombia could argue it was 
protecting. 
197 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 118, at 41, para. 53. 
198 See generally, Boed, supra note 190, at 4–8. 
199 Walsh, supra note 61, at 140. 
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One alternative to the traditional necessity defense is to 
assert a state of necessity in protecting Colombia’s essential in-
terest in maintaining internal peace, requiring slightly less be 
at stake than the existence of the state.  As seen above, Profes-
sor Ago specifically listed the maintenance of internal peace as 
an essential interest in his notes.  This less extreme, yet still 
equally essential interest does not require that the very exis-
tence of Colombia’s government be at risk, but rather, simply 
that the FARC and other terrorist groups in Colombia 
represent a threat to the internal peace of the country, and 
that Colombia’s actions attempted to protect its essential inter-
est in maintaining internal peace.  For the reasons discussed 
below, it seems that the essential interest in maintaining in-
ternal peace is Colombia’s most persuasive argument. 
“Grave and Imminent Peril” 
After asserting a recognized essential interest, the state 
claiming a necessity defense must show that the essential in-
terest is threatened by a “grave and imminent peril.”200  In 
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, the ICJ expressed that imminence 
“goes far beyond the concept of ‘possibility.’”201  In considering 
“peril,” the ICJ held that it evokes the idea of risk in reference 
to a relevant point in time.202  It was this prong of the state of 
necessity analysis that Hungary failed to establish in the Gab-
cikovo-Nagymaros case.   As Roman Boed succinctly states, 
“[t]he Court concluded that Hungary’s necessity claim failed to 
satisfy the ‘imminence’ prong, reasoning that the dangers to 
the environment allegedly inherent in the project were not suf-
ficiently established at the time of the breach.”203
In turning to Aerial Herbicide Spraying, Colombia’s neces-
 
                                                 
200 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 118. 
201 Boed, supra note 190, at 28 (citing Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, su-
pra note 118, para. 54). 
202 Laursen, supra note 190. 
203 Boed, supra note 190, at 16 (citing Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, su-
pra note 118, paras. 54-57). 
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sity claim is ostensibly founded on the grave and imminent pe-
ril presented by the revolutionary FARC and other narcotics-
funded terrorist groups in Colombia’s southern regions.  The 
existence and operation of these groups is clearly a “peril” inso-
far as FARC and other groups represent a risk to Colombia’s 
internal peace at the same point in time at which Colombia 
stands accused of violating international obligations.  However, 
it is precisely this point in time that may present a problem.  
Colombia will likely have a much harder time proving the 
“immediacy” of the peril.  In short, the FARC, and other terror-
ist groups, are not a new problem to Colombia.  In fact, the Co-
lombian government has been battling the FARC for over fifty 
years,204 during which time the FARC has historically been 
able to operate in the jungles of southern Colombia.  Indeed, 
Frank M. Walsh estimates: “[t]he war with the FARC has 
claimed the lives of more the 250,000 Colombians and has forc-
ibly displaced more than 1,350,000 [people].”205
Colombia will likely point to this violent domestic history 
as its basis for asserting its essential interest in maintaining 
internal peace, but how do the recent Plan Colombia sprayings 
forming the basis of Ecuador’s Application fit into this history?  
Walsh pinpoints 2002 as the turning point in Colombia’s war 
with the FARC, citing the generous American aid package dis-
cussed in Part II, supra, and the strong leadership of President 
Alvaro Uribe as reasons for Colombia’s newfound progress.  
This year 2002 is also the same time Ecuador claims Colom-
bian forces violated international law by spraying across the 
state’s shared border, a fact that seems to aid the causal rela-
tionship element of Ecuador’s transboundary harm claim.  
However, this turning point analysis is also advantageous to 
Colombia.  Colombia can use this interpretation as evidence of 
the continued imminence the FARC threat represents to inter-
nal peace.  Colombia could argue that it was the success of Plan 
Colombia sprayings that led to the recent decline of the FARC 
   
                                                 
204 Walsh, supra note 61, at 139. 
205 Id. at 140 (citing Luz E. Nagle, Placing Blame Where Blame is Due: 
The Culpability of Illegal Armed Groups and Narcotraffickers in Colombia’s 
Environmental and Human Rights Catastrophes, 29 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 1, 22-23 (2004)). 
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and other narco-terrorist groups, and that the resulting condi-
tions helped Colombia achieve a more peaceful domestic envi-
ronment.  In sum, it is likely that Colombia could successfully 
convince the Court that the threat of revolutionary armed 
forces such as FARC represented both a grave and imminent 
peril at the time Ecuador alleges Colombia violated its interna-
tional obligations. 
“Only Means” Available  
The ICJ adopted the ILC view that the “only means” avail-
able requirement was to be strictly interpreted, implying that 
the peril must not have been escapable by any other means, 
even a more costly one, that could be adopted in compliance 
with international obligations.206  For example, the Court de-
nied Hungary’s necessity claim in Gabcikovo-Nagymaros is in 
part based on its finding that means other than breaching in-
ternational obligations were available to Hungary to safeguard 
its interest in protecting the environment in the region.207
In the present dispute, Colombia’s defense depends on a 
showing that conducting a multi-million dollar aerial herbicide 
spraying campaign was the only means available to Colombia 
to protect its essential interest in maintaining internal peace 
from the peril of the FARC insurgents. This is perhaps the 
most difficult requirement for Colombia to meet.  While much 
of the U.S. foreign aid was conditioned on Colombia implement-
ing the U.S.-favored supply control strategy emphasizing mass 
aerial spraying, taking aid from the U.S. was simply not Co-
lombia’s only option – it was only the most expensive option.  
Indeed, considering the historic lack of success aerial fumiga-
tions has had in Colombia, it seems that Colombia was in a 
unique position to consider a variety of alternative domestic 
drug policies.   
 
There are many other options Colombia might choose to 
                                                 
206 Boed, supra note 190, at 17.   
207 Id. 
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combat its narcotics problem.  One only need to look to other 
states’ national drug policies to see the many options available 
to Colombia – options that may be more effective and less 
harmful to the environment.  For example, Colombia could 
have waged an intensive “surge” of ground troops in its south-
ern regions to eradicate illicit crops, or could have attempted 
further negotiations with the FARC as former-president An-
dres Pastrana did.  Alternatively, Colombia could have opted to 
implement a DEA-style operation of locating crops from the air 
and then manually destroying any illicit cultivation on the 
ground, or could have pursued a reform of its domestic drug 
laws.  Indeed, some of the alternatives to Colombia’s supply 
control policy were recently outlined in the Wall Street Journal 
by former Latin American heads of state Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso, Cesar Gaviria, and Ernesto Zedillo, of Brazil, Colom-
bia, and Mexico, respectively.208
In sum, without providing an exhaustive summary of every 
possible alternative and rationales for why all these alternative 
policies were not available to Colombia, it is unlikely that Co-
lombia will meet its burden of showing that its aerial fumiga-
tions were the only means by which it could protect its essen-
tial interest in maintaining internal peace.  
   
 The Balancing Requirement 
Assuming, arguendo, that Colombia is able to satisfy all of 
the preceding requirements for a state of necessity defense, it 
must also show that it has not seriously impaired an essential 
interest of a State towards which the obligation existed - in this 
case - Ecuador.  As Boed puts it, this requirement constitutes a 
balancing test:  “A plea of necessity is valid only if the scales tip 
                                                 
208 Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Cesar Gaviria, & Ernesto Zedillo, The 
War on Drugs is a Failure, Feb. 23, 2009, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123535114271444981.html.  
The former Presidents stated:  
Prohibitionist policies based on eradication, interdiction and criminali-
zation of consumption [of drugs] simply haven’t worked . . . In this spi-
rit, we propose a paradigm shift in drug policies based on three guiding 
principles: reduce the harm caused by drugs, decrease drug consump-
tion through education, and aggressively combat organized crime. 
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in favor of the essential interest of the State that has acted un-
lawfully.”209
In this case, an analysis of the competing essential inter-
ests could determine an international legal hierarchy, within a 
state of necessity defense analysis, with potentially far-
reaching implications beyond the particular facts of Aerial 
Herbicide Spraying.  If Colombia’s interest outweighs Ecua-
dor’s interest, the floodgates to transboundary pollution will 
likely open, allowing any state with an interest in maintaining 
domestic peace to pollute across borders with impunity, regard-
less of international agreements or obligations imposed by cus-
tomary international law.  If Ecuador’s interest outweighs Co-
lombia’s interest, states currently engaged in transboundary 
pollution may find themselves before the ICJ without the bene-
fit of a state of necessity defense.  This would require the ICJ to 
adopt a clear and explanatory framework for transboundary 
pollution claims, and provide a thorough evaluation of a state’s 
sic utere duty and other rules of international environmental 
law.  However, because Plan Colombia sprayings were not the 
only means available to Colombia to protect its essential inter-
est in maintaining internal peace, it is possible that the ICJ 
will not reach this final balancing requirement in its analysis, 
leaving these questions open for debate. 
  Thus, this final requirement contemplates balanc-
ing two competing essential interests:  Colombia’s interest in 
maintaining internal peace against Ecuador’s interest in pre-
serving its environment.   
V.    CONCLUSION 
In sum, at the preliminary stage of this writing, Ecuador 
alleges very serious transboundary harm claims against Co-
lombia in the Aerial Herbicide Spraying case, including harms 
to people, animals, crops, and the environment.  This article 
analyzes each of these categories of harm, along with the politi-
cal and historical background behind the Plan Colombia fumi-
                                                 
209 Boed, supra note 190, at 18. 
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gation efforts.  Beginning with the jurisprudential precedent 
provided by past ICJ opinions with respect to international en-
vironmental law, this article focuses on the transboundary pol-
lution claim brought by Ecuador and the potential for Colombia 
to assert a state of necessity defense.  In concluding that Ecua-
dor is likely to prevail on its transboundary pollution claim, 
this article argues that Colombia’s best defense – a state of ne-
cessity predicated on Colombia’s essential interest in maintain-
ing internal peace – must fail because it does not satisfy the 
“only means available” prong of the Court’s analysis.   
The Case Concerning Aerial Herbicide Spraying may, in 
time, come to be recognized as a landmark decision, and possi-
bly the first of a “third wave” of transboundary harm disputes 
in which a state of origin is held liable for material damages to 
an affected state.  Furthermore, this dispute poses important 
questions that will impact the future of transboundary pollu-
tion litigation as well as the corpus of international environ-
mental law.  The status of the sic utere principle contained in 
Article 3 of the ILC’s Draft Articles on Prevention, the substan-
tive and procedural obligations imposed on States by that prin-
ciple, and other core principles of international environmental 
law require judicial interpretation and meaningful application 
before any progress can be made in advancing their legal sta-
tus.  The extent to which a state may protect an essential in-
terest when that interest competes with another state’s essen-
tial interest in protecting its environment is also another area 
in which the voice of the ICJ is necessary to give substance to 
what remains an ambiguous balancing act between potentially 
competing rules of customary international law.  Assuming the 
current allegations are raised before the Court, a failure to ad-
dress at least some of the environmental issues would be tan-
tamount to abandoning the hope that international environ-
mental law has a role to play in adjudicating even the most 
basic environmental claims.   
 While these issues of international environmental law 
are increasingly pressing in an ever-balkanizing global com-
munity, it is also important to note that this dispute raises oth-
er concerns outside the realm of international environmental 
law, such as the potential for third-party liability and the ef-
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fects of unilateral use of force across State borders to protect 
internal peace.  In the past, such concerns have sometimes 
overwhelmed the environmental issues on the international 
stage, but given the inherent environmental nature of Ecua-
dor’s claims against Colombia, it would be inconceivable for the 
ICJ to render an opinion neglecting the most fundamental na-
ture of the issues highlighted in this article.   
  
 
